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As Strawson points out, something acknowledged by many is that a funda-
mental part of the meaning of any natural language can be ‘explicable either in
terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion’ (Strawson, 2004,
p. 178). A clear instance where the notion of truth plays an obvious role is when
we account for themeaning of descriptive language – i.e., language used to con-
vey and exchange information about the world. Semantic theories that centre
on this notion conceive of the meaning of a linguistic expression as a contribu-
tion to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which it occurs.
Even though language is frequently used as a descriptive device, and truth-
conditional semantics is a powerful and productive theoretical tool, it is neither
the case that a descriptive function exhausts the expressive potential of a natural
language, nor that the notion of truth can aspire to model every facet of linguis-
tic meaning as a whole. In fact, there is a vast realm of linguistic phenomena
that evade explanation in terms of truth-conditions. It is easy to recall expres-
sions, or even sentences, that are clearly meaningful but recalcitrant to consid-
erations of truth or falsehood. Interjections like ‘hurray’ or ‘alas’, for example,
are meaningful expressions that seem to lack any interesting truth-conditional
profile, and since compositionality is usually a dogma of semantic theory, it is
hard to see how such expressions would contribute to the truth-conditions of
the sentences in which they occur.
Predelli’s book, as made explicit in the title, is concerned with non-truth-
conditionalmeaning: the residual ofmeaning left untouched by truth-conditio-
nal semantics, and specifically that which is embedded at the semantic level.
The aim of the book is to provide a fruitful theoretical framework to account
for some seemingly heterogeneous non-truth-conditional linguistic phenom-
ena. Predelli does not, then, seek to construct a theory of non-truth-conditional
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meaning, but rather a collection of interrelated concepts within which singular
theories of specific non-truth-conditional phenomena can be stated and artic-
ulated. Rather than discussing the plausibility of his framework or the philo-
sophical concerns that it could raise, Predelli’s argumentative strategy consists
in showcasing how his framework performs when applied to apparently differ-
ent linguistic phenomena. The reader is, then, to appreciate the framework by
its fruits.
The main idea of the book is to account for non-truth-conditional meaning
in terms of constraints on appropriate contexts of use. If for truth-conditional
semanticsmeaning equals truth-conditions, then for non-truth-conditional se-
mantics meaning exceeds truth-conditions, and can be found also in usage. An
expression contributes to the truth-conditions of the sentence inwhich it occurs
in the same way that it contributes to the use-conditions of that sentence. In
the former case, an expression constrains contexts in which a sentence is true,
while in the latter case it constrains contexts in which a sentence is appropri-
ately used. Predelli holds that this two-fold dimension of meaning is encoded
at the semantic conventional level such that an expression can be represented
as a pair character-bias, where ‘character’ is the usual Kaplanian function from
contexts to intentions that accounts for truth-conditional meaning, and a ‘bias’
is the element that encodes the non-truth-conditional contribution.
The book is divided into three parts: In the first, Predelli briefly presents a
truth-conditional theoretical framework and introduces the notion of ‘settle-
ment’. This sets the stage for the second part, which is devoted to the concept of
‘bias’, and which contains themain part of the book and his proposal. The third
part deals with the concepts of ‘obstinacy’ and ‘recruitment’ and is intended as
an extended case study – a further testbed for his framework with the case of
demostratives. In what follows I will make a critical summary of the contents
of Predelli’s book, and I will then make a very brief overall evaluation. For my
starting point I will take the concept of settlement, as presented in part one.
The concept of settlement can be understood as a generalization of the con-
cept of ‘truth in any context’ in which the concept is relativized to a type of use.
For example, the sentence ‘it rains or it doesn’t rain’ is truth in all contexts, while
the sentence ‘I am speaking now’ is true when uttered by a speaker in a genuine
face-to-face conversation, but is clearly not true in all contexts. Still, itmanifests
a similar ‘penchant for truth’ (45). Indeed, the sentence is true in all contexts that
belong to the above type of use.
To understand how Predelli manages to account for such a phenomenon it
is helpful to look at his conception of linguistic use. A use, for Predelli, is a pair
expression-context, where a context is the familiar Kaplanian n-tuple compris-
ing at least a possible-world, a time, a location, and an agent. While every use is
associated with such a pair, not every expression-context pair represents a use.
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For example, a silent context in which no expression is used cannot represent a
use of that expression. Only contexts of use – a proper subclass of the class of
all contexts – can do that. A context belongs to the class of ‘context of use’ if it
meets certain necessary conditions, such as the existence, at somepoint in time,
of tokens of a certain expression, or the existence of an intentional agent.
Considerations regarding such constraints amount to a theory of ‘generic’
use of an expression. Uses can be classified, then, in types – like face-to-face,
text messaging, etc. – simply by distinguishing type-specific constraints on the
context. For example, a face-to-face type of use would require that the speaker
exists in that context and actually tokens the articulation of that expression.
Predelli only sketches a theory of use for this or that type of use because such
enterprise is only peripheral tohis project. What hewants to show is that, given a
type of use individuated by negotiable necessary constraints on contexts of use,
we can find some sentences to be always true within that use and that this is
due to constraints and not to reasons concerning character. So, in our previous
example, the sentence ‘I am speaking now’ is settled, i.e., always true, in a face-
to-face type of use because in such contexts the speaker must both be present
and uttering the sentence.
I think that Predelli’s concept of settlement is very interesting for a non truth-
condition-centred semantic theory. In fact, if meaning is also use, such a theory
ought to account for use-specific regularities, like truth-conditional theory of
meaning does with regularities having to do with truth-conditional features of
language. After all, the notion of settlement resembles the notion of tautology.
For example, a settled sentence for a specific typeof use, like a tautology, has null
semantic informative status. That does notmean that such sentences cannot be
used to impart information on a different, perhaps a pragmatic, level, but only
that the semantic information they purport is already built on the constraints of
that specific type of use, and is thus redundant.
One side of the moral of part one of the book is a piece of negative method-
ological advice: Do not confuse evidence of penchant for truth compatible with
cases of mere settlement for evidence of truth by virtue of character only. Pre-
delli labels this methodological mistake ‘the fallacy of misplaced character’ and
it is committed whenever we let truth-conditions dominate our understanding
of meaning.
Throughout part one Predelli considers constraints on specific types of use
without further investigation into where those constraints come from. Part two
advances the hypothesis that in some cases constraints on contexts of use of a
specific expressionor on sentences containing that expression are to be found at
the semantic level, embedded in the very conventional meaning of that expres-
sion. Interjections like ‘hurray’ and ‘alas’ are clear examples. These expressions
lack any interesting truth-conditional profile but aremeaningful and determine
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the proper contexts of use of sentences in which they occur. For example, in
the sentence ‘Hurray! John got the job!’, ‘hurray’ is to count as properly used
only if the speaker is favourably disposed towards the fact that John got the job.
This constraint is not type-specific, but expression-specific. In other words, the
constraints for a context of use to count as a proper context of use of that ex-
pression is part of the semantic parcel of that expression. As already stated, it
is this dimension of the meaning of an expression – distinct from the character
and directly connected to the use of a sentence – that Predelli calls a ‘bias’. In
this way the conventional meaning of an expression exceeds its character and
should be represented as a pair character-bias.
Predelli’s hypothesis is very intriguing. He deals with non-truth-conditional
aspects of meaning basically by extending truth-conditional semantics in a way
that preserves the semantic compositionality and semantic innocence (constant
semantic import across all contexts) of an expression even when the expression
has no truth-conditional profile. Evenmore promising, he sketches an example
of logic for biased expression – like ‘hurray’ – where traditional logic concerned
with truth-preserving relations is enriched with considerations about a broader
notion of ‘meaning encoded’ interactions. Furthermore, his distinction is co-
gent in that, at the explanatory level, neither character nor bias can do alone
what they can when combined. In fact, just as there are expressions without an
interesting truth-conditional profile, there are expressions without an interest-
ing non-truth-conditional profile, such as proper names. Indeed, in what sense
would the meaning of a proper name constrain a proper context of use? When
a proper name is properly used?
In the two central sections of part two Predelli shows us how to deal with ex-
pressions that are not purely biased, that is, biased expressions of a non-trivial
character. The phenomena he elects as representative concern questions of reg-
ister and coarseness; child directed speech, and honorifics, and slurs. These last
kind of expressions occupy awhole section and prove particularly fertile ground
for non-truth-conditional explorations.
The thirdpart focuses on thenotions of obstinacy and recruitment as prelim-
inaries, to show how Predelli’s notion of bias can provide a novel account of cer-
tain puzzles involving demostratives. Obstinacy is, for Predelli, a phenomenon
that arises when an indexical expression behaves context insensitively. Borrow-
ing Predelli’s own example, in the sentence ‘oh Maury, you’re in your second
childhood’ the indexicals ‘you’ and ‘your’ should be context sensitive, but in this
particular case the vocative at the beginning of the sentence fixes the contextual
parameterneeded for saturation,making them, at all effects, context insensitive.
According toPredelli, vocatives are biased expressions, but they arenot pure-
biased, since they have an interesting truth-conditional profile. They are pecu-
liar expressions because their bias is determined by their character: in fact, tak-
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ing our previous examples, the vocative can be represented as something like
voc(name), and a context of use is appropriate if and only if the addressee of the
speaker is ‘name’. Predelli names such linguistic devices ‘recruitment devices’
and the linguistic phenomenon they generate ‘recruitment’.
In the remainder of part three Predelli deals with cases of demostratives, for
which thedemostratumis givenby the sentence itself. Examples are semaphores
– like in Quine’s Giorgione sentence – and pure quotations. To exemplify his ap-
proach I will now briefly turn to his treatment of quotations.
In his section on ‘Davidsonian quotations’ Predelli deals with two seemingly
contrasting intuitions about pure quotations: on the one hand, Davidson’s in-
tuition that pure quotations behaves (roughly) as demostratives – they point to
the ‘content’ within the quotationmarks; on the other hand they display a clear
context-insensitivity that is counterintuitive for a demostratives. To conciliate
these two intuitions, Predelli shows how his analysis of non-truth-conditional
meaning in terms of bias can get the work done. Predelli argues that q-terms
manifesting context-insensitivity is actually a case of obstinate indexicality. Spe-
cifically, it is a case of context-insensitivity derived from the q-term’s monoga-
mous concern for whatever happens to occur in its ‘internal structure’ (173).
Overall, I find Predelli’s project highly interesting both in terms of originality
and applicability. As he himself describes it, it ismore of an empirical enterprise
than a philosophy book in the strict sense. However, it should prove a rewarding
read forboth linguists andphilosophers, and for anyone interested innon-truth-
conditional meaning and natural language semantics in general.
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